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Abstract
We determine the eect of individual social capital on income in the United States.
We use data from the General Social Survey and separate individuals into three dierent
occupation groups: occupations who require continual usage of social capital, such
as carpenters and plumbers; occupations with one time usage of social capital, such
as desk jobs where connections are useful in nding the job; and farming jobs. We
nd that social capital has a positive eect on all types of incomes, though only nd
signicant results for \desk jobs", with a 20% eect of social capital on income. This
number is consistent with ndings for other countries with dierent types of social
capital mechanisms.
y Graduate Student, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 403
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31 Introduction
Building social capital is considered to be benecial due to its relationship with economic
activity. \Social capital, while not all things to all people, is many things to many
people". (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) In our paper, social capital is dened as a
function of linkages or connections, between individuals or groups and the associated
norms. The connections between individuals allow for communication between parties,
thus enabling the formation and dispersion of norms. Norms are specic expectations
shared communally, such as not littering or returning a lost wallet.
Because in this paper we use individual data without the city and state specied1
we can only observe individual level social capital and not the spillovers that occur
in towns and cities. One way we can think of spillovers from social capital are from
trust-sensitive transactions, those which would require future payments and are hard
to monitor. With trust and norms present, individuals must spend less to protect
themselves from being exploited. Diminishing the fear of being cheated encourages
innovation of new products and ideas (reducing uncertainty regarding the transaction)
thus inducing creativity and allowing for human and physical capital to increase. We
argue that while trust and norms act as a shift in overall economic activity, but do not
aect an individual's income, that is, if an individual nds himself in a community with
high levels of social capital (norms and trust) it is possible that his/her income might
not be higher . For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) study the eect of social capital
on growth in a sample of seventeen OECD member countries. They supply evidence
that trust and civic cooperation have signicant impacts on aggregate economic activity.
But our question is: within such an economy, what propels one individual forward?
Using data from the GSS, we determine the eect of social capital on personal
income in the United States. The GSS contains statistics on demographic, behavior
and attitudinal questions from 1972 to 2006. It includes household level characteristics
provided by the individual answering the questionnaire. We dene social capital as
made up by the connections that an individual has to others, and the norms and trust
that are formed by these linkages. However, because we believe that trust and norms
will not aect individual's incomes, we will particularly look at memberships. Responses
that are of use in our analysis include membership to dierent types of groups such as
1Zip code data is trust-sensitive and is available through the General Social Surveys (GSS). Future papers
will try to incorporate this into the research.
4political, sports, youth or religious (linkages); and beliefs and expectations regarding
the general population such as likelihood of people being fair or helpful on average. We
use trust as an instrument variable since it is highly correlated with our measure of
social capital but not with income. The GSS contains data on respondent's trust on
dierent individuals or groups, such as family, strangers, or the government.
To my knowledge, there are no similarly detailed studies for the United States, an
economy that diers drastically from developing countries where this type of study has
been mostly conducted. A study with similar objectives was conducted by (Narayan
and Pritchett, 1999) in Tanzania. Rural Tanzania, however, is a very poor area where
average annual consumption expenditures reported was $180 per person for the survey
year of 1993-1994. In addition, most of the population is employed in traditional agri-
cultural with a substantial component of subsistence. On the other hand, the (GSS,
our data of choice, reports a mean respondent income between 15;000to24,999 for the
United States in 1994. Our sample will also have greater heterogeneity in labor choice,
as a contrast to Tanzania's rural population. Furthermore, little work has been done
to advance the theoretical background of social capital in relation to economic indica-
tors. As a policy tool, social capital has been evoked by many organizations, including
the World Bank (for example, see Woolcock and Narayan (2000)) under their Social
Development group. While social capital has mostly been looked upon as a tool for
community development in developing countries it could also be of use for the poorest
in the United States, and developed countries generally.
Of importance is that social capital is likely to aect income dierently depending
on personal occupation. Some individuals are likely to only be inuenced by social
capital sporadically, perhaps when looking for a new job (i.e. obtaining a referral from
an acquaintance). On the other hand, some jobs are very likely to be aected daily by
social capital. Jobs that require word-of-mouth to amplify the number of customers,
such as doctors or carpenters will rely on their social capital for new customers. The
social capital component in these types of jobs can enter in several ways. For example, an
acquaintance will likely request the individual's business because their linkage provides
the element of trust. Furthermore, this customer is likely to in turn recommend their
network to use his friend's services.
To elicit the impacts of social capital on income, we use a modied Mincer equation
(Mincer, 1974) by regressing income on our social capital measures and a set of control
5variables. Much like when estimating the eects of human capital on earnings, there is a
problem with endogeneity in social capital. Our assumption is that economic outcomes,
such as income, are functions of social capital. In turn, social capital is potentially
a function of economic characteristics, suggesting a two-way causality between social
capital and income. To mitigate the resulting bias of OLS estimators, we turn to an
instrumental variable estimation framework. Fortunately, the survey contains a cache
of data available as viable instruments for both the human capital and social capital.
In addition, there is endogeneity in the model arising from omitted variables. For this
reason, we include individual characteristics that are correlated with both social capital
and income, including gender and religion as covariates.
Our contribution to the literature is as follows: we lay a theoretical background for
social capital and its relation to income; provide empirical evidence about the contri-
bution of social capital to income in the United States; explore ways in which social
capital may aect dierent regions and groups specically dierent occupations, thus
identifying its validity as a policy objective; we compare and contrast the dierent roles
that social capital plays in a developing country and a developed country.
This study should appeal to researchers and policy makers interested in commu-
nity development, and aid to underdeveloped areas or close-knit communities within
developed economies.
2 Background
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) observe the consumption of the Tanzanian economy in
a sample of Tanzanian villages using the Social Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS)
which asks individuals questions on three dimensions of social capital. Tanzania is
a very poor country, where most of the population is employed in agriculture and
where the imputed value of production for own consumption accounts for about half of
consumption expenditures. We nd that it is more appropriate to regard individuals
as units as opposed to households because the dynamics of American life is dierent
to those of developing countries. The survey employed questions on the three main
subgroups of social capital. Regarding membership, the response includes information
on whether groups are inclusive or exclusive. Their assumption is that inclusive groups
contribute more to social capital than membership to exclusive groups.
Within a sample of Tanzanian villages, (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) nd that
6higher levels of associational memberships are related to higher incomes. The model
used includes dummy variables for six agroclimatic regions of Tanzania to control par-
tially for economic and agroclimatic diversity in the country. The results of the OLS
regression show that as social capital increases, consumption expenditure increases. So-
cial capital would also increase with income if instead of capital it were a normal good.
To prove otherwise, they use trust as an instrumental variable for social capital, since
they believe that trust is the least likely to be inuenced by income. The authors nd:
(a) that social capital is an exogenous determinant of income, and that it does in fact
have spillover eects, that is, the income of those households interviewed were aected
by the social capital of other households in their villages as well as by their own; (b)
an increase in village social capital increases the income of all households in the village
substantially; (c) a one standard-deviation increase in the village social capital index
is associated with at least 20% higher expenditures per person in each household in
the village. They also explore various channels in which social capital works to aect
household income such as social capital and village-level cooperation and innovation
diusion.
As mentioned, the United States has a dierent economic and demographic structure
than Tanzania. De Tocqueville (2003) noted with regards to the United States that
\The political associations which exist in the United States are only a
single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations in
that country. Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions,
constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manu-
facturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand
other kinds{religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous
or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to
found establishments for education, to build inns, to construct churches, to
diuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner they
found hospitals, prisons, and schools."
However, Putnam (2001a)'s book on civic societies shows that there has been a
decrease in American associational life. Yet, while on decline, associational life is still an
important component of American life, and potentially important for income formation.
Social capital though, is very tricky to measure as there is no market price to record
unlike many other types of capital. Putnam (2001a)'s approached social capital by
examining the quantity of associational membership and activity as shown by the survey,
and without using empirical testing.
72.1 Social Capital Eects on Earnings
In what ways may social capital enter the utility function for an individual living in
the United States? A well-researched path involved the impact of social networks on
the probability of nding a job, and even more so, the probability that this job will
be a better alternative than a job found without the help of a contact. However, it is
of debate whether the impact of social networks may be found on earnings or rather
on non-monetary components of utility such as search time, and closeness between
job requirements and eld of education (i.e. that the individual's education will be
applicable to the job).
Granovetter (1995) explores the issue of job seekers nding job opportunities by uti-
lizing their social connections. His book discusses dierent benets of social networks
on earnings, some widely accepted and some having met some controversy. It has been
shown that people nd work through social networks and not only through formal chan-
nels, such as submitting an application or resume2. Another argument from Granovetter
(1995) is that social networks allow job seekers to better understand the availability of
jobs and their characteristics, thus enabling them to nd a better match for themselves,
leading to higher wages and job satisfaction. According to his book, weak ties are better
for generating information about labor markets due to the redundancy of information
in close ties. However, this point has been controversial and many studies have failed
to provide evidence that there exist wage bonuses and monetary benets of social net-
works3. For example, Franzen and Hangartner (2006) nds that social capital does not
have a monetary eect, but they do nd presence of non-monetary eects from social
networks, which they claim are more benecial than jobs not obtained through a social
network.
In general, there is not consistent evidence that the use of networking is associated
with higher wages. However, it has been found that applicants that were employed with
referrals had a higher chance of getting hired ( Fernandez and Weinberg (1997)) . This
is a bit perplexing, since even if a referred job gives the worker the same amount as
a non-referred job, if it causes the job seeker to obtain job faster with a referral, he
is in fact earning more money than if he were unemployed or receiving his reservation
2For similar studies see (Mouw, 2003) who looks at the eect of social capital on nding a job, comparing
those with and without connections to the job.
3For reviews refer also to Granovetter (1995), Marsden and Gorman (2001), Lin (1999), and Bartus
(2001)
8wage. Especially at a time of economic hardship, being able to nd a job quicker is
very important for someone unemployed, and if contacts can help to make the search
faster, then the overall income is then higher (versus more time with zero income or
unemployment benets).
3 Theory
How do the United States dier from developing countries regarding social capital? The
theoretical background of social capital for income leans heavily on the assumption that
households rely on production to generate wages.
For example, theory shown in Isham et al. (2002), the utility maximization for a
household that is optimizing over a range of utilities is Uit = U(Zit(Xit;Tit;Wit)) for
a household i at time t, where Z is a vector of commodities, X is the vector of market
good allocation, T is the vector of time allocation and W is a xed input which includes
physical capital, environmental conditions and social capital 4. Social capital can act
as a \lubricant" for agricultural production in communities, facilitating management of
shared resources and improving the household's access to commodities such as water or
sanitation.
However, farming in the United States is very dierent from households in developing
countries that concentrate on farming. Income in rural farms in the United States for
2008 was $31;108 and $41;953 in urban farms. The poverty rate was 16:6% and 13:9%,
comparatively. This shows that the majority of farmers in the United States are not
living in poverty (Economic Research Service. The Economics of Food and America.
(2010)).
Furthermore, the majority of the poor of the United States are not heavily employed
in farming, therefore consideration for industry jobs becomes a necessity. While social
capital may be an important factor which enters utility and aect people's lives, it is not
just through production decisions. Still, when we create private bonds with people they
are likely to have spillovers into our professional lives (the bond may help in dierent
ways, such as nding a new job, or a job for a son or nephew).
Social capital will aect individuals dierently depending on their occupation. This
is because of the nature of the occupation that a person is involved with. That is,
4Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) and Betancourt (1996) show how social capital is a part of household
production.
9some occupations such as construction or carpentry rely on word of mouth and repeat
custumers for future income. For this type of occupation, reputation becomes a very
important commodity. On the other hand, many desk jobs are only inuenced by social
capital in obtaining the job, and once that the job is obtained, social capital does not
have any further monetary benets. An example of this would be a secretary job, where
once that job is obtained social capital is still important for other aspects of life but not
for the current income.
In terms of a reputation-heavy job, we can model the income in period one and two
for a two-period scenario, where in the rst period the income y is y1 = piq and in the
second period y2 = z1ipz+npn+rpr ,where p is a vector of prices indexed by consumers
of period 1 (i), and q is the quantity provided for each consumer (this allows for dierent
prices to be presented to each consumer, as is typical in these type of jobs which allow
for some bargaining). In period 2, z1i corresponds to the number of referrals from a
consumer in period 1, pz is the price vector for consumers referred, n is the number
of new consumers for period 2 (which do not have a referral) and r is the number of
returning custumers, with pn and pr referring to the price vectors of new and returning
custumers, respectively. 5 The more memberships that an individual is exposed to, the
more connections that are available to add to a network of possible clients.
For theory on the inuence of connections on search time, which would be applicable
both to the type of occupation that is social capital intensive and the type that only
requires one-time use of social capital, refer to references given in Section 2.
4 Data
Using data from the (GSS, we determine the eect of social capital on personal income
in the United States. The GSS contains statistics on demographic, behavior and attitu-
dinal questions from 1972 to 2006. It includes household-level characteristics provided
by the individual answering the questionnaire. We dene social capital as made up
by the connections that an individual has to others, and the trust and norms that are
formed by these linkages. Responses that are of use in our analysis include membership
to dierent types of groups, such as political, sports, youth or religious (linkages); trust
held on dierent individuals or groups, such as family, the government (trust); and
5Alternatively, it could be modeled as E(y) = Pr(in   networkneedsservicethisperiod)p+Rp+Np where
E(y) is the expected income for a specic period, R are referred customers that were previously outside of
network and N are new customers that were previously outside of network.
10Table 1: Percentage of Group Membership
Memberships Number of Members Most Important For Respondent
Total 1.76 - -
Church or Religious 35.5% 7430 32.8%
Farm 19.2% 791 1.7%
Fraternal 9.7 % 1993 5.1%
School Fraternity 4.8 % 985 1.7 %
Hobby 9.6 % 1984 4.3 %
Literary or Art 9.2 1891 1.9%
Nationality 3.3 % 687 1.0 %
Other 10.2 % 2048 4.9 %
Political 4.2 % 859 1.6 %
Professional 14.7 % 3035 6.9%
School Service 13.7 2823 7.7 %
Service 9.8 % 2033 4.5 %
Sport 19.2 3968 15.8%
Labor Unions 13.5 % 2776 3.3%
Veteran 7.1 % 1468 2.6%
Youth 9.8 % 2014 4.2 %
beliefs and expectations regarding the general population, such as likelihood of return-
ing a lost wallet if found (norms). Unfortunately, not all annual surveys ask the same
questions, thus we break up the study into dierent years depending on availability of
questions.
Starting in 1975, the GSS has used full-probability sampling of households designed
to give every household the equal probability of being included in the survey. However,
only one adult per household is interviewed (Davis and Smith, 1992). Household-level
variables are self-weighting, but we are utilizing individual-level data and in large house-
holds each individual has a lower probability of being chosen to respond. Therefore,
to compensate we weight our statistical results in proportion to the number of persons
over 18 in the household.
Questions on membership were asked in the years 1974-75, 1977-78, 1980, 1983-84,
1986-91, 1993-94, and 2004. Responses for membership are shown in Table 1. On
average, people belong to one or two groups. About 35% of people belong to a church
organization, with the highest number of members in this sample.
Column (3) of Table 1 was collected by asking \Which one of these groups or organi-
zations [from those memberships that the respondent answers yes] are you most active
in?", and was only collected for 1987.
115 Methodology
To elicit the impacts of social capital on income, we use a modied Mincer equation
(Mincer, 1974) by regressing income on our social capital measures and a set of control
variables.
We start with a typical mincer equation,
yi =  + 1imemnumi + 2iXi (1)
,where y is the natural logarithm of income for an individual i and X is a matrix of
other individual characteristics included.
These variables are included to isolate the eect of social capital on income, by
controlling for the other factors that are known to aect it. The covariates included
are age, age squared, highest degree attained (the respondent can choose between less
than high school, high school, associate/junior college, bachelor's and graduate), gender,
race, religion, region (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North
Central, South Atlantic, East South central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacic)
size (population to the nearest 1,000 of the smallest civil division listed by the U.S.
Census) and year of interview. Age squared is included to account for the nonlinearity
in the eect of age on earnings.
A challenge when using the GSS data, comes from the fact that the income is
recorded in brackets. Because of this, we observe the certain interval on a continuous
scale for which the income belongs to, but never directly observing the real income
of the respondent. The data are also censored in the way that both end intervals are
open-ended. The problem is that we are trying to estimate the eect that social capital
has on income, without knowing the actual level of income. There are several ways
to confront the issue of income brackets. We choose to assign an income level to each
individual by using the GSS-created variable conrinc. It has been shown that imputed
income estimators usually suer estimation problems. Drawbacks from ad hoc Least
Square Estimators are summarized in Berg and Lien (2002) and (Hsiao, 1983). However,
the main problem is that the standard errors will overstate the precision of estimation
since within-bracket variation is suppressed and the error is not taken into account,
potentially causing the eects of the regression to appear signicant even when they are
not. Plainly, the standard errors will be larger than if we were to use a more ecient
estimator, say probit or other maximum likelihood estimator. Using an EM-algorithm
as Berg and Lien (2002) would increase the eciency, but if we obtain good estimates
12using OLS then we know that our estimates using maximum likelihood would be even
better.
As discussed, the income variable, y, is not continuous, instead it is reported in
income brackets. The observed income variable yi is discrete and dened as
yi = j; ifaj 1 < y
i < aj; for j 2 1;2;:::;n (2)
,where n is the number of bracket divisions in the income variable. The income-bracket
thresholds (aj)J
j=1 are part of the GSS design and partition the real line into dierent
partitions, depending on the year, in the following manner:  inf = a0 < a1::: <
aj = inf. As explained, this is overcome by using a GSS-created variable conrinc,
which records income variables income72, income, income77, income82, income86 and
income91 into six-digit numbers and converts them to 2000 constant dollars.
Much like when estimating the eects of human capital on earnings, there is a
problem with endogeneity in social capital. Our assumption is that economic outcomes,
such as income, are functions of social capital. In turn, social capital is potentially
a function of economic characteristics, suggesting a two-way causality between social
capital and income. To mitigate the resulting bias of OLS estimators, we turn to an
instrumental variable estimation framework. Fortunately, the survey contains a cache
of data available as viable instruments for both the human capital and social capital.
6 Results
Our regression covers the years 1974-75, 1977-78, 1980, 1983-84, 1986-91, 1993-94, and
2004, since these are the years we have membership data for. The variables memnum
is the main component of social capital, though we run initial regressions with trust
and norms but found that their results were not signicantly dierent from zero. One
of our variable for norms was composed by combining two dierent questions from the
GSS, helpful and fair. The questions for these variables are, \Would you say that
most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for
themselves?" with answers helpful, lookout for self, depends, and \Do you think most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to
be fair?" with answers fair, take advantage, depends, respectively. We use a polychoric
principal component analysis to nd an aggregate vector of norms. The polychoric
correlation of two ordinal variables (in our case we use the answers for helpful and fair)
13is calculated assuming that each of the ordinal variables was obtained by categorizing
a normally distributed underlying variable, and those two unobserved variables follow
a bivariate normal distribution. The maximum likelihood estimate of that correlation
is the polychoric correlation Kolenikov and Angeles (2005). Alternatively, we also used
the variable selfirst which states \You have to take care of yourself rst, and if you
have any energy left over, then help other people." with answers \strongly agree",
\agree", \neither agree nor disagree" and \strongly disagree". The variable memnum
aggregates all memberships that the individual has (including fraternities, sports clubs,
and churches).
We start with a simple general OLS model to see the signs and signicance of our
dierent components of social capital. The dependent variable is the log of constant
income in 2000 dollars created by the GSS based on categorical mid-points and impu-
tations and all of our relevant covariates are included.
Table 6 shows promising results. First of all, most of our coecients for social
capital are statistically signicant. In column (1) we run an OLS regression using an
aggregate measure of linkages and the principal component of norms. The sign for the
total number of memberships joined by an individual (memnum) is positive, showing
that we expect membership to clubs to increase income, though it is quite small. In
column (2) we look at an OLS regression where membership is dierentiated by type,
these being memberships to fraternal groups, service groups, veteran groups, political
clubs, labor unions, sport clubs, youth groups, school service groups, hobby clubs, school
fraternities, nationality groups, farm organizations, literary or art groups, professional
societies, church or religious groups, and other groups not specically mentioned. It
is of interest that not all memberships show positive returns to income, these being
religious memberships, literary or art groups, school service groups, veteran groups and
youth groups 6.
In Table 6 we have used the polychoric principal component of fair and helpful as
a proxy for norms. The coecient on norms is positive though very small and not
signicant. Similar regressions ran with variables of norms and dierent factors showed
that results for the eect of norms on income were extremely small.
Some results on the covariates which are omitted from Table 6 that we had expected
6There could be an issue of selection here. For example, someone that belongs to a veteran group has











































Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
15to see are that females earn a lower income than males and that income increases with
age but at a decreasing rate. We see some changes in income depending on region,
religion and race.
Next, in order to establish causality and to deal with the endogeneity problem from
social capital, we use instrument variables. In order for the instrument variables to
be valid, they must be correlated with the specic component of social capital, but not
with income through any other channel than social capital itself in order to estimate the
eect of exogenous shifts in social capital on income. Finding a good instrument vari-
able eliminates the possible simultaneity relationship between social capital and income.
(Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) uses the individual's levels of trust in various groups
as an instrument variable for membership. The assumption is that the trust held by the
individuals in strangers and institutions do not directly aect household income and are
not aected by household income themselves, thus being a potential instrument vari-
able. Furthermore, greater levels of trust do lead to higher social capital. La Porta et al.
(1996) show that trust is an important component for the survival of large organizations
and civic groups or associations where participation is mostly voluntary. They nd a
strong bivariate correlation between expressed degrees of trust and membership in asso-
ciations. Trust is not included in all social capitalists as part of social capital, however,
Putnam (2001b) nds that while social trust is not part of the denition, he believes it
to at least be a close consequence, and therefore could be thought as a good proxy. He
shows that there is a positive correlation between associational life and trust, as trust in
strangers increases so does the number of memberships that are attended by individuals.
In the GSS, data about trust in strangers are collected by asking \Generally speak-
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in
dealing with people?" with answers \can trust", \can't trust" and \depends" 7.
From Table 2 we nd even stronger results than from a simple OLS regression, mem-
berships have an impact of 18.9 %. The same regression was run with norms included,
and while the coecient for norm was small, the coecient for membership was even
larger, at 36.3%. This implies that excluding norms may actually be underestimating
7I only use the answers \can trust" and \can't trust" as an instrument variable.









Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
our estimates for the eect of linkages on income, perhaps stemming from local spillover
eects.
Trust as an instrument performs very well statistically, with an F-statistic of 28.54.
Because with trust as an instrument the regression is exactly identied and thus it is not
possible to test for weak identication, we included extra instruments on the condence
held in dierent branches of the government, and trust in strangers was not rejected
and does not fail the validity test.
Next, we start breaking down the model into dierent occupation types. The GSS
started using the 1980's census code for occupations in 1988, and previously used 1970's
census code, therefore we work with both classications in our data. The GSS variable
occ80 corresponds to the 1980 Census Occupational Category, which includes about 1000
dierent types of occupations, and occ70 to the 1970 Census Occupational Category
which contains about the same number of occupations. We choose to break down
the occupations into larger categories that are more relevant to our study, these being
potentially social capital-intensive occupations (SCI) where continuous contracting is
required, one-time social capital occupations (OTS) and farming occupations 8. A farm
8The categories under the 1980's Census are: Executive, Administrate, and Managerial Occupations
(Managerial); Professional Specialty Occupations (professional) which has the subsets of doctors, artists,
and athletes which may behave dierently in terms of social capital as other professionals such as statisti-
cians and chemists; Technicians and Related Support Occupations (technical); Sales Occupations (Sales);
Administrative Support Occupations (admin) which includes clerical work; Private Household Occupations
(maid); Protective Service Occupations (protect), Armed Forces (armed); Service Occupations, Except Pro-
tective and Household (service); Farming, Forest, and Fishing Occupations (farm); Fishers, Hunters and
Trappers (Hunters); Mechanics and Repairers (repair); Construction Trades (construct); Extractive Oc-
cupations (extract); Precision Production Occupations (production); Machine Operators, Assemblers, and
Inspections (operators); Transportation and Material Moving Occupations (drivers); Handlers, Equipment
cleaners, Helpers, and Laborers (helpers)
17Table 3: Social Capital by Occupation
(1) (2) (3)
lninc OTS SCI FARM
memnum 0.192* 0.0735 0.606
(0.105) (0.117) (0.511)
Observations 9,158 2,647 193
R-squared 0.224 0.327 -0.052
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
category is included to see the contrast between farmers in developed and developing
countries and their usage of social capital.
It is interesting that we only nd a large and signicant eect of social capital for
the type of occupation that is not social capital intensive. The eect of social capital on
this type of occupation was 19.2% which is very close to the results found by Narayan
and Pritchett (1999) (around 20 %). We nd that the eect on social capital-intensive
jobs is positive but small, at 7.35%, although not signicant, and quite large for farming
jobs although again not signicant. We have the least observations for farming jobs (at
193) which could explain why we do not see relevant results.
7 Conclusions
In this preliminary investigation we use instrument variable methods to estimate the
eect of membership on income in the United States. Our instrument of choice is trust
in strangers because it has high correlation with associational life but it does not have a
correlation with the unobservables in the income generating equation. We also explore
the dierent ways in which social capital can enter an individual's income equation
for three dierent types of occupations; social capital-intensive occupations, one-time
usage social capital occupations, and farming occupations. We nd positive eects of
belonging to memberships for all types of occupations, although we only get signicant
results for one-time usage type of occupations with a result very similar to those found
by Narayan and Pritchett (1999). In terms of farming jobs, we did not have enough
observations to make any claims of the eect of social capital on farming incomes.
Further advances in this research will include analysis of individuals at the lower end of
the income distribution.
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